
When we talk about the thorny path of the Ukrainian penitentiary system and the corresponding penitentiary reform — and the fact that it is thorny, has been and remains so, I think no one will dispute that — the incomparable Michel Foucault immediately comes to mind with his opinion that ‘everyone understands that prison is the most disgusting and ineffective solution to the problem. But no one knows what solution is better than prison.’
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we were left with a huge amount of work to do in order to truly ensure humane conditions of imprisonment and create appropriate conditions for the resocialisation of people who had come into conflict with the law and found themselves behind bars.
The 1990s: The foundation for reform
The 1990s were truly a period of turbulent events and further steps that became a springboard for all subsequent reforms in the penitentiary sphere in Ukraine. The first such fundamental event was the creation of the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences as an independent autonomous structure, independent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
I would not like to focus too much on organisational structures and formalities, because during my professional life I have already formed a sufficient basis for a critical approach to the law as a regulator of social relations.
Nevertheless, I cannot fail to mention — and this reform should serve as an example for any positive reform — how Ukraine ‘wrestled’ the penitentiary system out of the ‘grip’ of the police department. This was done, first and foremost, to initiate rehabilitation potential and, secondly, to drive a simple but effective wedge between the fates of specific individuals who were in the penitentiary system and the threat of inhuman treatment.
The role of the Council of Europe
In fact, it was a very simple and pragmatic idea: why should the penitentiary system, and most importantly, pre-trial detention centres, not be under the jurisdiction of the police?
In this context, it is worth recalling that in 1997, the Council of Europe conducted a brilliant analysis of the Ukrainian prison system, entitled ‘Assessment of the Prison System in Ukraine’. This document remains relevant to this day and serves as an example for all further reform steps.
These lines have remained vividly etched in my memory since that time, and they read as follows: ‘Ukraine must sever all ties with the police and criminal prosecution authorities and create an independent, socially autonomous structure for the state administration of the penitentiary system.’ This is precisely what was created.
Comprehensive analysis of reform
I would not like to focus solely on the 1990s, because we need to talk about the comprehensive reform of the Ukrainian prison system. And, of course, it may be very inappropriate to say what would have happened if the Ukrainian prison system had taken a different path. It took the path it took, and we must reject any speculation on this matter.
On the other hand, we cannot fail to mention both the successful and completely unsuccessful management steps in the field of penitentiary reform.
Certainly, I will take full responsibility and dare to remind you, for example, that just as the 1998 reform was one of the most important, successful and pro-European, so the 2016 reform, linked to the liquidation of the penitentiary service, was the least prepared and least successful penitentiary reform. Although I would not want to downplay the significance of these administrative steps, because they simply happened. And even if they were unsuccessful, they ensured further reform.
Achievements and challenges
It can be said that Ukrainian penitentiary reform over the past 35 years has been truly remarkable and successful in many ways. It is probably impossible to compare the situation that existed at the beginning and even in the middle and at the end of the 1990s with the current situation.
Prison subculture as an imperial project
The Ukrainian prison system has never been left out of Russian imperial projects. And in April this year, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture informally declared this year to be the year of countering informal prison hierarchies in the post-Soviet space, preparing and publishing a corresponding prison standard, which is called ‘Informal Prison Hierarchies’.
If we analyse this document, we see that in the post-Soviet space — even if we distance ourselves as much as possible from Irving Hoffman’s classic works on total institutions and the corresponding institutional informal rules that exist in any total institution — we can still conclude that the informal prison subculture that continues to exist (and we have to admit this) in Ukrainian penitentiary institutions, is an artificial product created within the framework of the imperialist policies of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and, in fact, the modern Russian neo-empire. This product is used to keep certain social groups in the post-Soviet space under control in an appropriate manner. Ukraine is no exception.
War as a challenge
I will skip the points related to the direct impact of the war on infrastructure and human rights in penitentiary institutions. I would like to say that the war has also demonstrated how important the penitentiary system is. The war has shown that the penitentiary system is one of the tools for promoting Russian imperial narratives through the existence of a prison subculture with corresponding informal social strata.
This is obvious to me. It is no coincidence that in the reform concept — I am very critical of any conceptual documents, strategies, programmes, etc. — but I cannot fail to emphasise the great value of the fact that the current Strategy for Reforming the Penitentiary System of Ukraine places special emphasis on countering prison subculture, which is considered de facto as a threat to national security in the context of the functioning of an integral element of the Ukrainian state, namely the penitentiary system.
The prison system is an extension of justice. And, accordingly, the existence and dominance of informal rules in prison is nothing less than an attack on justice and an undermining of justice.
Successes during the war
Speaking about the prospects for reform, I would like to emphasise that Ukraine has undoubtedly passed this test, as evidenced by the latest ECtHR report, in which Ukraine demonstrated that even during the war, human rights — and I am not saying this as a slogan or a declaration — are protected. During the war, Ukraine was able to protect human rights in places of detention. This applies to both Ukrainian citizens and prisoners of war who are being held in places of detention in Ukraine.
Future challenges
Unfortunately, the war has destroyed many initiatives. We will have to restore the social aspect of prisons, which has been developed over the last 35 years and has been largely destroyed.
We must understand and talk about the fact that during and after the war, the social component of the penitentiary system will be weakened by a dangerous imperative. That is, ‘What prisoners’ rights are you talking about when the whole of Ukraine is in ruins and ordinary people have no housing, pensions, salaries, food or medicine, while you are taking care of some “convicts”.’
Unfortunately, this message will be heard. Ukrainian politicians and officials must be prepared for this. I am calling a spade a spade. This is a very dangerous message, but it will be heard, it will definitely be heard. The question is: to what extent will Ukrainian society be able to prevent this message from dominating the political component of prison reform?
On the other hand — and this probably applies not only to prison officers, but primarily to police officers — it can still be said that many officers involved in the work of the police and the penitentiary system have, in one way or another, seen the front line. And the emphasis will shift. The agenda for reforming Ukraine’s prison system will include not only the renovation of prisons, the construction of new prisons, and the renewal of material resources. It will also include the renewal of the social approach to working with people in the prison system.
Conclusion
Ukrainian prison reform has had a rocky road from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present day. Despite numerous challenges, including war, the prison system has shown resilience and the ability to protect human rights even in the most difficult conditions. Countering prison subculture as an element of the Russian imperial project remains critical to Ukraine’s national security. Further reform must take into account not only material restoration, but also the preservation and development of a social approach to working with prisoners.



