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In the twenty-first century, torture, formally prohibited by universal and regional human rights standards and the legislation of modern states, has become an important hidden tool of social control policy, which is formed outside the formal legal framework and, more importantly, often without a subject (although in some cases torture and ill-treatment may acquire legal form and subjective features).
For the above reasons, political science has a much greater potential for a more profound study of the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment, as well as the preconditions and causes of the spread of this phenomenon and related social practices in the twenty-first century.
A simplified (formal legal) approach to the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment, which, according to some scholars, should theoretically disappear (or at least decrease) in the course of global development through the operation of international law, the humanisation of criminal law, the reduction of the prison population, etc., conceals a great danger.
At the outset, we believe it is appropriate to provide an example that clearly illustrates the research issues and demonstrates the degree of relevance of the issues we raise.
In February 2023, the world learned about the plans of the El Salvadoran authorities and the corresponding actions taken to implement them to accommodate more than 40,000 prisoners taken into custody in the country under a state of emergency following a surge in murders and other violent crimes in the newly built CECOT prison.
In El Salvador, beginning in the 1990s, street and prison gangs began to gain strength and influence as members were deported from the United States following the end of the Salvadoran civil war. The two largest street gangs were and still are Mara Salvatrucha (known as MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang (Barrio 18). Other, less influential gangs are La Maquina, Mao Mao and Mirada Loca. In 2020, El Salvador had approximately 60,000 gang members and 400,000 people who were involved in gang activities in one way or another.
From 25 to 27 March 2022, Salvadoran gangs killed 87 people, 62 of whom were killed on 26 March alone, making it the deadliest day in El Salvador’s history since the end of the civil war in 1992.
In response to the violence, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador declared a state of emergency, which suspended some constitutional rights and made it easier for the country’s security forces to carry out mass arrests of suspected gang members. Over the next seven months, about 55,000 suspected gang members were arrested. Due to the large number of arrests, the President of El Salvador announced the construction of a new prison with a capacity of 40,000 inmates. By the time CECOT opened in January 2023, the El Salvadoran government had arrested more than 62,000 suspected gang members
As a result, the new mega-prison, the Terrorism Confinement Centre (CECOT), has become the largest prison in Latin America and one of the largest in the world in terms of prison population. At the same time, CECOT has become — and this is critical — a symbol of a new penitentiary policy not only in El Salvador, but also in many other countries.
The CECOT megaprison consists of eight buildings. Each building has 32 cells with an area of approximately 100 square metres. The grounds cover 23 hectares, and the El Salvadoran government additionally oversees an adjacent 140 hectares around the prison. The prison is surrounded by 19 guard towers, two rows of 9-metre-high, 60-centimetre-thick walls covered with barbed wire, two rows of electrified fences and a gravel floor designed to make footsteps audible. As of 11 June 2024, there were 14532 prisoners in CECOT
Photographs circulated throughout the world’s media showed the first large group of prisoners — tattooed, barefoot and wearing only white, identical shorts. The prisoners were left sitting on the floor with their hands behind their heads, where they were placed tightly together, facing the back of their heads, before being led into their cells.
From the very beginning, the policy of the authorities was to place representatives of different street and prison gangs, who are mortal enemies on the outside, in the same cell, creating a new mechanism of collective “self-education” by forcing mortal enemies to tolerate each other in a very limited space.
On average, there is 0.6 square metres per prisoner. Prisoners are only allowed to leave their cells for 30 minutes for exercise, Bible study, online court hearings within the prison, or to be placed in solitary confinement. Prisoners are not allowed to study, rest in separate rooms, have visits or phone calls. Their food consists of rice, beans, eggs and pasta, but they are not provided with crockery as it can be used as a weapon.
The government of El Salvador has no plans to release any prisoners from CECOT, and the Minister of Justice and Public Security has stated that prisoners in CECOT will never return to their communities. The Minister also ruled out rehabilitation programmes for CECOT prisoners.
On 1 June 2023, El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele announced that he would build a prison similar to CECOT for white-collar criminals as part of his “war on corruption”. Nayib Bukele said the prison would be called the Corruption Detention Centre (CECOC).
Politicians across Latin America, in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador and Peru, have implemented or called for security policies similar to those implemented by El Salvador. Before the 2023 presidential election in Guatemala, one of the candidates stated that she would build two mega-prisons to “end the scourge of murder, assassination, and extortion in our country“, while another candidate promised to create at least three new similar prisons. In January 2024, the President of Ecuador announced that he would build two prisons for 12,000 inmates each, and that they would be modelled on CECOT. In June 2024, the President of Honduras announced that she would build a prison with a capacity of 20,000 inmates, based on the CECOT model. In April 2025, Costa Rica’s Minister of Justice visited CECOT and told reporters that Costa Rica “will import all the best practices and see how we can bring them to a successful implementation in our legal system“.
Anyone who has even a superficial understanding of penitentiary institutions and human rights in the penitentiary system will ask: how can people be held in such conditions in the early twenty-first century, and how can they be held against the backdrop of numerous UN and regional human rights standards and global civilisational development?
Thereafter, as before, for the purposes of this study, we emphasise The stereotype that torture has allegedly become less common in the twenty-first century due to the “humanisation of social relations” is extremely dangerous for the purposes of the torture prevention policy itself, including its victimological aspects.
Therefore, we defend our thesis that in the twenty-first century there is a continuing trend towards the expansion of the use of torture and ill-treatment in both open and covert forms, which is implemented mainly within the framework of extra-normative, subjectless policies for the purpose of social control, giving a qualitatively new meaning to power relations.
The use of torture and inhuman treatment against “dangerous deviants“, “criminals“, “terrorists“, “predators” and other types of “dangerous persons” has become a widespread practice even in Western and other democratic countries, although an extensive and well-tested system of formal legal safeguards and safeguards has been developed, created in the second half of the twentieth century and developed in the early twenty-first century, helped to make the practice of torture and inhuman treatment as rare as possible (especially at the European regional level — thanks to the Council of Europe, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Thus, despite the fact that torture and inhuman treatment are formally outside the scope of national law and human rights standards, torture and inhuman treatment today exist precisely as an instrument of social control policy and are widely used as a social practice, the study of which requires not a narrow legal analysis of the concept of torture as a formal definition, but rather a study of this phenomenon (phenomenon) and relevant social practices through the prism of political science in order to find the answer to the question: am I
This informal policy has a categorically negative connotation, which does not exclude the existence of such a policy as an objective component of modern power relations, even in the absence of formally declared subjects of such a policy.
In our earlier studies of the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment in the twenty-first century, we emphasised three factors that influenced the disappearance of formalised (procedural) torture as a means of evidence in criminal proceedings and a form of criminal and disciplinary punishment in relations of power in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and most importantly, as a legitimised subjective policy: 1) classical-philanthropic; 2) pragmatic; 3) disciplinary.
Acknowledging the cumulative effect of all three of the above factors, we consider it necessary to study social practices of torture mainly as an instrument of subjectless politics in the context of the influence of the disciplinary factor, which caused the policy of torture to depart from its subjective form (demonstrating the right to use force) and “dissolved” torture within the disciplinary and penal mechanisms of the exercise of power.
It is this approach, formulated by Rusche, Kirchheimer and Foucault, that explains the “external” disappearance of torture by the fact that for the purposes of social control in the conditions of the emerging and gaining momentum capitalism, methods of panoptic discipline of society and the spread of social control networks were much preferable and economically more profitable than harsh formalised public procedures directed against the body, which in the Middle Ages was often the only property of a person. While in the Middle Ages it was public torture and corporal punishment that symbolised and demonstrated the unlimited power of the sovereign or feudal lord, from the end of the eighteenth century, numerous methods of social control and surveillance of a panoptic nature relatively quickly replaced cruel corporal punitive practices. All of this marked the end of the era of dominance of the first modulation of social control practices — the modulation of binary legality. At the same time, this period corresponded to the beginning of the second modulation — the modulation of discipline.
Foucault thoroughly explains the reasons for the shift from “legality” to “discipline” because the power for which sovereignty was a modality proved insufficient to manage the economy and political processes in a society that was experiencing a demographic explosion and industrialisation. Similarly, functionality explains the emergence of the supposedly “corrective” prison as a type and place of punishment: the use of torture ceased not because it was no longer considered humane, but only because it became economically unprofitable: “Homo penalis, that is, the man who is punished by law and who can be punished by law, this Homo penalis is in fact Homo economicus“. At the same time, this does not mean that torture has disappeared: it has only “gone into the shadows”, retaining its informal status and importance as an important auxiliary means of social control.
Based on Foucault’s scientific views, it can be noted that in the twenty-first century, the formally declared Homo penalis actually becomes not only Homo economicus, but also Homo disciplinatus, where numerous forms of torture and inhuman treatment are used by state agents and private actors (under licence from the state) as open and veiled instruments of social control over the general population, which must constantly be in the sphere of panoptic disciplinary mechanisms.
Exploring the transformation of modulations of punishment (legality – discipline – security), Foucault makes an important point: the process of transition from medieval criminal corporeal corporality to modern modulation of punishment “has been too hastily and categorically explained by a process of ‘humanisation’, thus dismissing the need for further analysis.
Similarly, we believe that the traditional criminal law and criminological analysis of modern national criminal justice systems exclusively in terms of greater humanisation, efficiency, and progressiveness has negative consequences for the policy of torture prevention and procedures for investigating torture cases, since such preventive activities are based on the myth of humanisation and the state’s declared inability to effectively prevent torture, which conceals the true causes of torture and inhuman treatment.
The formal legal approach mentioned above, with its key category of “humanisation“, cannot explain the even greater spread of torture and inhuman treatment in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of torture is an objective reality that cannot be ignored in the process of political analysis of contemporary power relations. Therefore, considering the prevalence of the phenomenon of torture in almost all countries of the world, and most importantly, the political demand for the use of inhuman treatment at the level of the nation-state, we can postulate the existence of a subjectless torture policy, within the framework of which social practices of torture are considered, if not a tool, then at least a predictable by-product (although we are inclined to the category of “tool”).
Sociologists and criminologists have a well-established view of crime that crime is a normal phenomenon for any society, but – we emphasise – in certain volumes and manifestations. An excessive concentration of deviance and crime is a sign of anomie
Similarly, the existence of a certain number of cases of torture and ill-treatment is a normal phenomenon in society, but in minimal numbers. A high concentration of torture and ill-treatment in society is a sign not only of anomie, but also of the fact that these practices have become profitable for the state, both in terms of the economy and the spread of panoptic discipline.
Torture and inhuman treatment are currently widely used in power relations by various political actors, where a flexible and, accordingly, dangerous formula for prohibiting torture – “absolute in principle but relative in application” – is in political circulation. Moreover, the American political field has introduced a categorically unacceptable conclusion for European politics that regulation of torture is better than prohibition.
However, even seemingly neutral or even pro-social political initiatives, strategies, and projects of the twenty-first century society indirectly lead to the use of torture and inhuman treatment through certain chain reactions, which are mainly related to wave campaigns of “fighting crime” aimed at increasing the level of crime detection (which is mostly characteristic of post-Soviet countries) or “securing society”, as well as the aforementioned increase in the types, types, and classes of deviants in modern societies.
Providing the author’s justification for the spread of the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment in the twenty-first century, developing Foucault’s modular concept and Cohen’s concept of the “punitive city”, we continue to form our concept of the transition of modern societies to the fourth modulation of social control and punitive practices – the postmodern modulation of panoptic risk management.
In our opinion, it is the “security of society” that is the key thesis that explains the spread of the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment in the twenty-first century against the background of the declared formal zero tolerance to such social practices.
Therefore, following Foucault and Cohen’s approach to the “spread of discipline“, “networking” and “crime management“, as well as Giddens’ approach to “islands of safety” in modern societies, and emphasising that torture did not disappear as a social phenomenon even in the second half of the twentieth century, as is claimed by the classical-formal approach, we postulate that torture and inhumane prolongation of punishment by agents of the state and representatives of political elites have been and remain the sphere of special governance, which gives grounds to support the idea of managing torture (one of the external manifestations of managing torture was the legalisation of torture, which since the second half of the twentieth century has been called enhanced interrogation techniques).
The largely invisible nature of torture and ill-treatment in the twenty-first century does not mean that such social practices do not exist. Any political regime tries to control the population (especially those strata that are considered “dangerous” or at least “unreliable” for the functioning of such a regime), where torture and inhuman treatment can be considered a kind of “by-product” of the mechanisms of panoptic social control – a kind of “excess of lower-level executors” in the process of “securing society”. At the same time, the higher levels, on the contrary, actively and pompously declare the search for new, more effective and modern formal methods of combating torture.
Therefore, another manifestation of managing torture is the permanent violation of human rights in penitentiary institutions and other places of detention, which often takes the form of a constant deviation from the CPT standards, where the Committee often uses the formula “The Committee reiterates” or “The Committee reiterates its recommendation“.
In this context, it should be recalled that torture is, firstly, not only the most severe manifestation of this phenomenon, associated with attempts to obtain information from the victim or to punish the victim. Over the decades of their work, both the ECtHR and the CPT have significantly expanded the list of actions or omissions of state agents that fall under the signs of torture or inhuman treatment, which may often not even be considered by citizens themselves as torture or inhuman treatment.
In addition, speaking of the spread of the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment in the twenty-first century, a special emphasis should be placed on the fact that this phenomenon cannot exist without the social support of citizens themselves, who give up their freedom in exchange for “securing society”. In the context of, to use Beck’s terminology, “security societies“, when “freedom” has dissolved into networks of “security”, “protection of society” and “gated communities“, and when every political crisis raises the issue of even greater “protection of society” from “threats of crime”, “illegal migration”, “dangerous predators” and “terrorism”, the process of veiled promotion of the use and even legalisation of torture is gaining new momentum, acquiring even more signs of politics with a tendency to further formalisation and subjectivity.
Thus, we can formulate our position on the nature of torture used today by agents of the state, which corresponds to the views of Cohen, Foucault, Beck and Bauman, regarding globalised “tourists”, localised “vagrants” and the saturation of the political body of society with “security” in order to further socially control every movement and even – as of today – the thoughts of the average citizen.
Political elites regularly saturate society with messages that are important for power relations: yes, torture and ill-treatment are abhorrent. Moreover, torture and ill-treatment are infinitely disgusting. However, they say, the world has unfortunately changed to such an extent that citizens are faced with a fundamental choice: either to “sacrifice” one terrorist (dangerous criminal, deviant, etc.) or to allow the gross violation of the rights or even death of hundreds of “law-abiding and respectable citizens”, thus subjecting the problem of torture and inhuman treatment to simulacrisation.
This explains not only the resurgence of torture and inhuman treatment as a phenomenon in the second half of the twentieth century, but also the spread of this phenomenon in the twenty-first century, where Foucault and Cohen’s views on the spread of social control networks and, as a result, the increase in the classes, types, and kinds of deviants that need to be controlled for the purposes of “security” are of particular importance.
On the one hand, national criminal justice systems (including penitentiary systems) cannot cope with the formally declared task of dealing with deviants exclusively within the framework of formal procedures enshrined in national legislation, against the background of an increase in the classes, types, kinds and, as a result, the number of deviants.
On the other hand, the citizens themselves, born in the times of the third and, more importantly, the fourth modulation of social control practices, in exchange for their “freedom” demand even greater “security”, where the ways and methods of achieving the appropriate concentration of security no longer matter to them. This is confirmed by the data of numerous sociological studies and surveys of the population in Europe and North America, where from one third to one half of citizens accept the use of torture against terrorists in order to achieve the same “security” declared by the state. And all this is happening against the backdrop of total social control over space, movements, and thoughts by the state, political elites and powerful private actors. However, the main thing is that the practical possibility of torture of a “terrorist” in order to obtain information about further terrorist acts or of a “dangerous murderer” in order to obtain his confession opens a “Pandora’s box”, where there is a broad and at the same time extremely dangerous prospect of torture against all “dangerous” “others” – dangerous offenders, persistent offenders, predators, sex offenders, members of criminal organisations and other “dangerous criminals“. Moreover, the registers of “dangerous” “others” are in clear danger of being expanded.
A striking example of the extent to which the outwardly declared subjective policy of torture prevention by nation-states is intertwined with the subjectless policy of torture is the support by modern states of prison subcultures and informal hierarchies in their national penitentiary systems.
For example, in its report on its 2018 visit to Moldova, the CPT highlighted the persistent problem of inter-prisoner violence, which has existed for decades and has become a “phenomenon” and a “deep-rooted problem” that is “far from being eliminated”.
Given the persistent presence of such episodes in penitentiary institutions and their seriousness, the CPT recommends that the state intensify its efforts to combat the phenomenon of violence in prisons.
Moreover, when states themselves acknowledge the existence of such a phenomenon and declare their policy of combating it, the question arises: isn’t the official acknowledgement of the failure to combat the phenomenon proof that the state actually supports it?
This is especially true in light of the fact that there is obvious tacit cooperation between the state authorities and the informal hierarchy of prisoners to maintain “order” among prisoners and ensure the “smooth running” of penitentiary institutions.
In its reports, the CPT points to the existence of “informal power structures among prisoners”, the fight against which is declared by the state as “counterproductive“, where the state feels “helpless in its attempts to curb the power of ‘high-ranking’ prisoners”, and therefore the state signs an informal agreement with “informal leaders” to maintain order among prisoners, where such an agreement ensures the “stable functioning” of penitentiary institutions.
Indeed, when the state “admits that it feels compelled to share some of its responsibility for order and security with ‘privileged prisoners’, this further raises the question of the political, but by no means legal, nature of this state of affairs in many modern countries.
It should be emphasised that today, in many countries of Europe and the world, it is officially recognised that the informal hierarchy of prisoners, or the caste system, is the basis of the functioning of penitentiary systems. Its traditions dictate the internal order and take precedence over the official rules, which theoretically should be used to exercise the “power to punish“.
Developing this thesis, it is necessary to emphasise that this state of affairs, which exists in many European (and not only European) prisons, “has serious erosive consequences for the entire criminal justice system”. Moreover, in such circumstances, any public policy of rehabilitation of deviants loses its meaning, and the deterrent effect of criminal punishment in the form of imprisonment is also practically lost. In addition, this state of affairs contributes to the creation of a dangerous environment in places of detention, as it distorts the purpose of imprisonment and the role of the penitentiary system.
Examples of the situation described above are not unique to the former Soviet Union, where there is still a strong influence of “criminal traditions” that are integral to official internal affairs and security policies and, more importantly, shaped by official internal affairs and security policies. For example, inter-prisoner violence remains a “disturbing phenomenon” even in English prisons, despite the British Prison Service’s extensive experience in prison management, dynamic security and rehabilitation of deviants.
As the CPT noted in its report on its visit to Cyprus in 2004, “the delegation had the impression that the leadership was unwilling to take a proactive stance” in countering the informal power of professional criminals
Subsequently, the Committee highlighted that the official measures declared by the state to address the problem of violence in the penitentiary system seem to have had only “limited success“, which together “contributed to the creation of an unsafe environment for prisoners”. The CPT calls for an urgent review of the policy on preventing violence in the penitentiary system and the introduction of a comprehensive anti-bullying policy, highlighting the government’s persistent failure to implement such a policy in the past.
Undoubtedly, the distribution of wealth is at the heart of the phenomenon of permanent prison violence and the failure of official policies to counteract it, as the CPT has also pointed out: cases of inter-prisoner violence are almost exclusively linked to the existence of a black market for prohibited substances and items, and, as a result, the debts of some prisoners.
However, the economical basis of torture policy goes much further than the black market in prisons. The point is that the prison systems of most modern states stimulate the existence of illegal economic relations not only in prisons, but also in criminal justice systems in a broader context, which also affects society. In the countries of the former USSR, the informal prison budget, based on the organised extortion of material assets from prisoners and their families, reaches many millions of euros annually, where the formal criminal justice system itself, including top managers of penitentiary systems, is usually not interested in stopping the filling of such a budget.
The answer to this can be found in another area.
On the one hand, the twenty-first century is a time of total digitalisation, the latest information technologies, the latest means of secret surveillance and control, new relations of power, new scientific achievements, new mechanisms aimed at overcoming economic and social problems of societies (including those considered to be the causes of crime).
On the other hand, it is the presence and widespread use in the twenty-first century of almost medieval superstitions, rituals, signs, informal semi-secret codes of conduct, tattoos, “principles”, “concepts”, slogans, etc. against the background of the declared inability of most states to provide sufficient funding to bring prison conditions to a standard that would at least exclude “minimum levels of cruelty”.
However, the main thing here is the declared opposition between the state power and the informal power of the twenty-first century Robin Hoods, where the state, without any hesitation, openly signs a clearly humiliating pact to provide it with “security guarantees” in the allegedly state penitentiary system in exchange for a “licence to use torture” granted to the Robin Hoods.
It is obvious that the picture demonstrated by the state is illusory, where this simulacrum disguises the direct interest of the state to keep under the umbrella of panoptic discipline as many declared and potential deviants as possible (although most of them are not), and at the same time to fill and use the informal budget of the penitentiary system for the personal needs of state agents.
Therefore, the problem can be formulated by the following question, which appears to be rhetorical: if even in the thirteenth century Robin Hood was eventually tamed by the Sheriff of Nottingham, why in the twenty-first century cannot the modern panoptic state tame “informal leaders” by ceding a large share of state power to them and granting these private actors a “license” to torture?
Summing up the above, we can once again emphasise that the policy of preventing torture and combating social practices of torture in the twenty-first century is a reflection of a complex dualistic political process: an attempt to further “secure society” with the simultaneous failure of such “security”, where at the same time we are talking about a declared attempt to “prevent torture” with the statement of the failure of “combating torture practices”.
In conclusion, we would like to highlight one important aspect, in our opinion.
Torture used by agents of the state against citizens and torture used by private actors against the same citizens are two sides of the same coin, where similar actions are used within the same system of power relations that is economically beneficial to the state and aimed at achieving the effect of panoptic control over the largest possible number of declared and potential deviants.
It is characteristic of the state that whenever torture becomes too cruel even for a particular society to accept, or there is a leak of information that causes the event to gain resonance, the state rushes to declare its agents as having no mandate from the state to use torture or other ill-treatment. The state begins to behave like a lizard, which at the moment of danger simply throws away its tail, realising that it will soon grow back, shifting all political, legal and moral responsibility to its own yesterday’s agents.
Despite the apparent primitiveness of this strategy, it works in most cases, especially if civil society tolerates ill-treatment. Therefore, in this context, we consider it appropriate to quote the CPT’s position: the state must recognise that the existence of ill-treatment by its agents is a fact, where ill-treatment is by no means the result of individual actions of a few rogue agents. Thus, torture is a component, an instrument and at the same time a consequence of a political course for which the state must be held accountable.
Finally, we can cite the most relevant example, namely the massive cases of torture and inhuman treatment that have been and continue to be used by agents of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians. The scale and regularity of the cases of torture have provided numerous UN commissions with more than reasonable grounds to assert that the torture of Ukrainians by Russians is not just numerous acts that fall under the definition of torture under both Ukrainian national law and international instruments. Moreover, it is not even a systemic phenomenon. Torture and inhuman treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians by Russians is a policy developed by the leadership of the Russian Federation, which is not only implemented by order of the leadership of the aggressor state. This policy is encouraged to the maximum extent possible, and its perpetrators not only received immunity from any criminal prosecution in advance, but also a clear message of encouragement to commit acts of torture against Ukrainians.
To summarise the above, it is necessary to emphasise that torture is not a legal category, but, first and foremost, a political one. Analysing the phenomenon of torture and inhuman treatment only within the formal framework of national criminal justice systems is dangerous not only for society and the victims of torture themselves, but also for those who use torture, especially given the highly questionable effectiveness and efficiency of torture (for which responsibility is subsequently placed on taxpayers who demand “more security”).
Torture and inhuman treatment through the prism of political analysis is an objective element of modern political relations, an integral part of power relations and at the same time a product of the spread of panoptic discipline in the society of the twenty-first century.
In the twenty-first century society, the practices of torture and inhuman treatment exist within two interrelated political spheres, one of which is a formalised subjective policy of torture prevention, which is formed and implemented within universal regional and national structures.
The second area is the subjectless policy of torture, which is formed within the framework of postmodern modulation of panoptic risk management, where torture and inhuman treatment are an instrument of social control over a new type of person – Homo disciplinatus.
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