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Armando Ramirez, an Hispanic inmate at California’s Pelican Bay State Prison, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials had discriminated against him on the basis of race when they: (1) subjected Hispanic inmates to a more intensive security-level reclassification review; (2) denied all Hispanic inmates the ability to work as “critical workers” during prison lockdowns; (3) confined Hispanic inmates to a small, concrete exercise yard for observation while allowing inmates of other races to be observed in the main exercise yard. The defendant prison officials moved for summary judgment on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity, and the district court issued a tentative and final ruling denying their motion.
Eight years after his conviction of first degree murder, on January 8, 1990, Armando Ramirez was transferred from Folsom State Prison to Pelican Bay State Prison. Ramirez was Hispanic and was from southern California (known as a “Southern Hispanic”); according to confidential sources, Ramirez was affiliated with both the Carson Barrio Probe gang, and the “EME” (“Mexican Mafia”), the prominent Southern Hispanic gang. As a result of these affiliations and a prison disciplinary record showing acts of violence, Ramirez was placed in “Close A” custody upon his arrival at Pelican Bay. By February 1992, his custody level had been reduced to “Close B.“
From January 1990 through Ramirez’s transfer to Lancaster State Prison on June 30, 1993, Pelican Bay was racked with intense prison violence – during this period, the Director of the California Department of Corrections was forced to declare a state of emergency at that prison no less than nine times. Prison officials believed that the major portion of this violence was instigated by Southern Hispanic inmates, who attacked Northern Hispanic inmates, Black inmates, and those Southern Hispanic inmates who would not help instigate violence. Indeed, seven of the states of emergencies were declared in the wake of violent incidents involving Southern Hispanics.
After one such incident on November 5, 1991, Program Administrator Helsel ordered a lockdown of the prison’s Facility B. During a lockdown, inmates are confined to their cells and only those inmates designated as “critical workers” can report to their jobs (and earn credit toward early release). During this lockdown, which lasted until December 11, 1991, Helsel allowed all “critical workers” – except Hispanic critical workers – to report to work.
On January 24, 1992, Hispanic and Black inmates from Facility B were involved in another violent incident. Associate Warden C.J. Johnson ordered Facility B locked down and imposed the same no-Hispanic-“critical worker” restriction. Although this lockdown was lifted on February 18, 1992, a third lockdown (with the same restrictions) was imposed on February 24, 1992, two days after a group of Southern Hispanics attacked four Black inmates in the main exercise yard. This lockdown ended on March 6, 1992.
In the midst of these lockdowns, Associate Warden Johnson asked Helsel and Correctional Counselor Galbraith to prepare a chart of the violent incidents occurring between November 5, 1991, and February 23, 1992. Galbraith analyzed the 51 incidents that occurred outside the Secured Housing Units, and specifically examined the 23 incidents involving Facility B, which seemed to be a magnet for violence. Those 23 incidents involved 58 inmates–1 White inmate, 5 Black inmates who all belonged to the Bloods street gang, and 52 Hispanic inmates. Although a number of the incident reports indicated that the Hispanics instigated the violence, Gilbraith’s chart did not reflect who instigated each incident.
Based on the data from Gilbraith’s study, prison officials began to reclassify those inmates in Facility B they felt might be most responsible for the violent incidents. They reviewed the files of two groups: Blacks and Hispanics. If a Black inmate’s file indicated he was a member of the Bloods street gang, he was scheduled to appear before the classification committee; of the 46 Bloods who appeared before the committee, 16 were raised to “Close A.”
The officials subjected Hispanic inmates to a more intensive review: If an Hispanic inmate had any gang affiliation or any disciplinary violations in his prison record, he was called before the committee. Of the 160 Hispanic inmates it reviewed, 58 inmates (including Ramirez) were raised to Close A and 20 others were placed in a “special increased custody program.” The officials claimed it was impossible for them to narrow any further the scope of their review of Hispanic inmates, which was aimed at finding those Hispanic inmates responsible for instigating the violence, because: (1) the Hispanics involved in the past incidents, unlike the Blacks who had been, did not belong to any one street gang or did not belong to any gang at all; and (2) the Hispanics orchestrating the violence still remained in the general population, given that segregating the inmates who had been involved in previous violent incidents had not stopped the violence in the general population. The officials reasoned that an Hispanic inmate who had been previously affiliated with any gang, or who had a prison record showing problems, would be more likely to be one of the unknown instigators than an inmate who had neither of the above characteristics.
Despite the reclassifications, the violence continued. On January 14, three Hispanic inmates assaulted a Black inmate in the Facility B law library. Facility B was locked down, and Hispanic “critical workers” were again prevented from working. When the lockdown was lifted, Black and White inmates from Facility B were released from their cells onto the main exercise yard for observation – Blacks occupied the yard for half the day, Whites for the other half – before they were released into the general population. Hispanics, however, were released from their cells into four smaller, concrete exercise yards for observation before they were released into the general population. The smaller yards, which had better gun coverage, were easier for the guards to monitor. The prison officials claimed it was necessary to observe the Hispanic inmates more closely since they had been responsible for instigating 28 out of the 45 violent incidents occurring in Facility B between January 15, 1993, and April 10, 1993.
On April 23, 1993, Ramirez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of due process, the Eighth Amendment, and equal protection. All but the equal protection claim were dismissed on June 11, 1993. Ramirez filed an amended complaint on June 30, 1993, alleging that the defendants violated his equal protection rights by their (1) intensive classification review of Hispanic inmates in Facility B; (2) denial of “critical worker” status to Hispanics during the November 6, 1991, January 24, 1992, February 24, 1992, and January 14, 1993, lockdowns; and (3) confinement of Hispanic inmates to the small, concrete yards for observation.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. When a law enforcement officer asserts qualified immunity from liability for civil damages, “the district court must determine whether, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, the officer objectively could have believed that his conduct was lawful.”
This inquiry involves a two-step analysis: “(1) Was the law governing the official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful?”. Whether the law was clearly established is a pure question of law for us to decide.
We stress at the outset that our next inquiry for qualified immunity purposes is a narrow one: We do not decide whether the defendants’ race-based actions were in fact reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of prison security.
We believe that the defendants could have reasonably believed that their greater scrutiny of the Hispanic inmates in Facility B for possible reclassification was reasonably related to safety. Seven of the nine states of emergency were called in response to violence involving Hispanic inmates, and 52 of the 58 inmates involved in violence during Gilbraith’s three-month study were Hispanic. It was therefore reasonable to believe that Hispanics were, as a group, more likely to be violent than other groups and thus more worthy of closer scrutiny. Nor do we believe that the defendants cast the net of their scrutiny too widely. Prison officials need not wait for an unknown instigator to incite riot before acting against him.
The incident reports did not indicate that only Hispanic gang members were involved in the disturbances – it was therefore reasonable for the defendants to believe that reclassifying only gang members would not stop all the violence. It was also reasonable to examine more closely those inmates with past disciplinary problems since they would logically be more likely to be disruptive than those prisoners with no history of past problems. While we agree with Ramirez that the defendants could have confined their scrutiny to Southern Hispanics (who were the Hispanic group more often involved in the violent incidents), we reiterate that Turner v. Safley (482 U.S. 78 (1987)) does not require the least restrictive alternative. We find that the defendants could have reasonably believed that reviewing the subset of Hispanic inmates that they did was reasonably related to prison security.
We are more troubled by the defendants’ treatment of Hispanic “critical workers” during the four lockdowns of Facility B. In normal circumstances, we would want to know why the defendants did not also deny Blacks who were members of the Bloods street gang critical worker status, when they were involved in many of the same violent incidents as the Hispanics who were denied that status. The defendants in this case were not, however, operating in “normal circumstances.” Although they did not face a full scale riot like the prison officials in White, Pelicans Bay’s recent history of Hispanic violence, as evidenced by numerous lockdowns and states of emergency, meant that the threat of such a riot was not imaginary. In such dire circumstances, we will not require of prison officials the same calm deliberation that we give to what is reasonable. In this case, the defendants knew that Hispanic inmates were a lightning rod for violence, but did not know which inmates instigated the outbreaks. With prison resources stretched to the limits enforcing the lockdown, the defendants could have reasonably believed that they could not chance further violent episodes in the workrooms. Their actions are not the actions of “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
We also conclude that the defendants were not unreasonable in their belief that confining Hispanic inmates coming off of lockdown to the small, concrete yards for observation was reasonably related to security. Ramirez observes that many of the conflicts involving Hispanic inmates were intra-racial, so that the defendants’ practice might actually instigate more violence. This misses the point, however. The smaller yards had better gun coverage, so that the violence–no matter what the target–could be better controlled. We find it reasonable for the defendants to have believed that watching more closely the group of inmates who were involved in the majority of violent incidents advanced prison security.
Armando Ramirez, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack R. Reagan; Charles D. Marshall, Warden; C.J. Johnson; Jourden; R. Linfor; P.J. Dillard; Galbraith Bush; Lawrence, Program Administrator at Pelican Bay State Prison; James Gomez, Director of Department of Corrections of the State of California, Defendants-appellants, 82 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1996). US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit – 82 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1996). Argued and Submitted March 14, 1996. Decided April 9, 1996.
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