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DOCS’s revisions were based on its conclusions that there was system-wide use by prison gangs of beads as gang membership identification symbols.
According to defendants, some prisoners were restringing religious beads, to project identifiable membership in particular gangs by the color of the beads.
DOCS concluded that the beads facilitated gang violence, rivalry and confrontation because inmates could identify rival gang members by the colors of the wearer’s beads.
Defendants claim that gang activity causes “friction, rivalries and even violence among inmates, thereby threatening the safety and security of the facility.”
The directive prohibiting the wearing of beads, thus, is defendants’ attempt to diminish gang violence and further “DOCS’s interest in stemming the activity of gangs and other unauthorized groups.”
Defendants have not shown how the directive, which prohibits the wearing of beads even under clothing, furthers the state’s compelling interest in the least restrictive manner. Plaintiffs convincingly argue that wearing beads under their clothes would address DOCS’ concerns.
Wearing of the beads in this manner avoids their public display and, hence, the easy identification of gang members, while simultaneously permitting plaintiffs to exercise their religion. I am troubled by defendants’ complete rejection of plaintiffs’ proposal based on what defendants speculatively describe as an “enforcement problem.”
Defendants further fear that they cannot ensure the beads will not be seen or exhibited if worn under clothing is not reasonably based. Defendants’ musings that the beads may be viewed when plaintiffs remove their clothes or might be seen through their clothing, are, considered in the most generous light, simply unconvincing. These hypothetical displays would be nothing more than passing occurrences that would not promote the easy gang identification which defendants allege is the reason beads facilitate gang violence.
Remarkably, defendants have not shown that there has been any attempted or actual illicit use by any prison gang of Santeria beads. I am not clear that the beads used by gang members in any way even remotely resemble Santeria beads, either in shape or color. Although defendants claim that beads have been permitted into the system solely for religious purposes, defendants have not shown how the Santeria beads specifically have been used by gangs to facilitate or encourage gang activity.
There has not been anything presented to this Court that shows that the real problem does not stem from some other source, for example gang use of craft and hobby beads, rather than from religious beads, be they Santeria beads or some other devotional article.
Even if defendants had presented cogent and compelling evidence establishing a correlation between the wearing of Santeria beads and gang violence, defendants have failed to dispute plaintiffs’ allegations that they are not gang members or that the beads they request to wear do not reflect any known gang colors. Defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ denial of personal gang association or activity is to hypothesize that plaintiffs’ beads may be restrung to reflect gang colors for improper use, and that DOCS is not aware of all the colors which may now, or some time in the future, be designated as a gang membership identifier.
The weakness of defendants’ position is evident. The possibility that beads may be restrung in order to reflect gang colors and gang affiliation in no way prevents DOCS personnel from confiscating such beads. In that case, the beads would no longer represent, or be used for, religious devotional purposes. Defendants’ further concern that some currently non-existent inmate group may in the future form and adopt colors, or that existing gangs may change colors, to coincide with the colors of plaintiffs’ Santeria beads, and then choose to wear them under their clothing without public display, is nothing less than “pure speculation,” which, as I have already stated, cannot and should not be the basis for burdening plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). US District Court for the Southern District of New York – 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). May 3, 1994
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