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The prosecutor in turn disclosed that he intended to discredit Mills’ testimony by calling Ehle back to the stand to testify that respondent, Mills, and Ehle were all members of a secret prison gang that was sworn to perjury and self-protection on each member’s behalf.
When, upon being cross-examined by the prosecutor, Mills denied knowledge of the prison gang, the prosecutor, as permitted by the District Court, recalled Ehle, who testified that he, respondent, and Mills were members of the prison gang and described the gang and its tenets.
The jury convicted respondent.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ehle’s rebuttal testimony was admitted not just to show that respondent’s and Mills’ membership in the prison gang might cause Mills to color his testimony, but also to show that, because Mills belonged to the gang, he must be lying on the stand.
The court further held that Ehle’s testimony implicated respondent as a member of the gang, but that since respondent did not take the stand, the testimony could not have been offered to impeach him and prejudiced him “by mere association.”
The prosecutor in turn disclosed that he intended to discredit Mills’ testimony by calling Ehle back to the stand and eliciting from Ehle the fact that respondent, Mills, and Ehle were all members of the “Aryan Brotherhood,” a secret prison gang that required its members always to deny the existence of the organization and to commit perjury, theft, and murder on each member’s behalf.
Respondent claims that the prosecutor cross-examined Mills about the gang not to show bias but to offer Mills’ membership in the gang as past conduct bearing on his veracity.
This was error under Rule 608(b), respondent contends, because the mere fact of Mills’ membership, without more, was not sufficiently probative of Mills’ character for truthfulness. Respondent cites a second error under the same Rule, contending that Ehle’s rebuttal testimony concerning the gang was extrinsic evidence offered to impugn Mills’ veracity, and extrinsic evidence is barred by Rule 608(b).
The Court of Appeals appears to have accepted respondent’s argument to this effect, at least in part. It said:
“Ehle’s testimony was not simply a matter of showing that Abel’s and Mills’ membership in the same organization might ’cause [Mills], consciously or otherwise, to color his testimony.’ . . . Rather it was to show as well that, because Mills and Abel were members of a gang whose members ‘will lie to protect the members,’ Mills must be lying on the stand.”
It seems clear to us that the proffered testimony with respect to Mills’ membership in the Aryan Brotherhood sufficed to show potential bias in favor of respondent; because of the tenets of the organization described, it might also impeach his veracity directly. But there is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. It would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar.
We intimate no view as to whether the evidence of Mills’ membership in an organization having the tenets ascribed to the Aryan Brotherhood would be a specific instance of Mills’ conduct which could not be proved against him by extrinsic evidence except as otherwise provided in Rule 608(b). It was enough that such evidence could properly be found admissible to show bias.
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). Decided: December 10, 1984
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