All-Russian Criminal Culture As a Threat to Ukraine's National Security

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Contemporary Russian prison subculture can be described as ‘traditional uniqueness’.

‘Traditional’ – because the dominance of criminal and prison subcultural norms has always been characteristic of Russian society.

‘Unique’ – because AUE (sub)culture is a new “cover” of centuries-old Russian criminal tradition (or traditional criminality).

However, the main thing in this context is that for modern Russian society, the application and use of the concept of ‘prison subculture’ can cause great difficulties; it would be more correct to use ‘prison culture’ or ‘national prison culture’.

Moreover, the concept of ‘counter-culture’ is even more inappropriate for describing contemporary social and political relations in Russia due to the general social support for prison informality by wide sections of the population, from central and local politicians to the lumpen. In fact, this support is the cementing ‘mortar’ for contemporary Russian society.

It is believed that ‘subcultures have special shared values and cultural practices that differ from the mainstream’ [1]. However, this approach does not work in the case of contemporary Russian society. From this perspective, it seems to us that the approach that ‘subculture is not connected to a larger cultural complex is categorically inapplicable to Russian society: it refers to norms that separate a group from society, not those that integrate it with it. Subcultural norms, unlike role norms, are unknown to other members of society, looked down upon or considered a divisive force.” [2]

Similarly, the position that ‘the values of a subculture conflict with the larger culture’ is inapplicable in assessing the Russian cultural space [3].

On the contrary, numerous symbols of the prison subculture are welcomed both at the level of the lumpen and middle class, and at the level of the central government, as exemplified by the well-known ‘higher imperative’ to ‘kill the bandits in the sortsier’. One can only recall how popular the Wagner PMC proved to be with the local population in Rostov during the famous ‘march on Moscow’ in June 2023. It would be naïve to talk about support as a form of protest against the aggressive war against Ukraine. Instead, it was a form of complete solidarity with a paramilitary group that was openly based on prison subcultural symbols.

And finally, the thesis that ‘in counterculture, the conflict element is central; many of the values of the subculture are indeed contrary to those of the dominant culture’ is also inapplicable to the Russian political and cultural space [4]. Given the natural unity of Russian national culture and the prison subculture, it can be assumed that the conflict will be a departure from prison categories, ‘concepts’ and hierarchies in all their manifestations.

And, perhaps, one cannot but agree with the classical view that ‘a subculture, as a pure type, does not require an intensive analysis of interaction with the larger culture for its understanding; its norms are not, to any significant extent, the product of this interaction.’ [5] Using the example of Russian national culture, we have proved that it is the product of intense diffusion with the prison subculture.

The Russian prison subculture is categorically not a counterculture; it is theflesh and blood ofthe broader Russian national culture. The carriers of this dualistic [sub]culture, unlike other examples, are not ‘abnormal’, ‘dysfunctional’, ‘delinquent’ or ‘deviant’ [6]. In the context of the political goals and programmes of the Russian political elites, this culture is not a negative phenomenon; it is not the result of the breakdown of society, the result of the inability to curb criminal instincts, or the result of the failure of the family, church or school [7].

On the contrary, criminal culture is an indicator of the successful implementation of political projects to ‘cement society’ against the ‘external enemy’, projects to increase the criminalisation of society in order to ‘fight the external enemy’ (the example of the Wagner PMC), projects to reorient the church to normalise the prison subculture as part of the existence and ‘future’ of the ‘Russian people’.

Moreover, the spread of prison culture in Russia is based on the domino principle, when every new phenomenon or every new event caused or conditioned by the influence of prison subculture gives rise to new forms of movements, actions or activities that are also related to prison and criminal/prison (sub)culture, and which are almost immediately imported to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries.

For example, since the second half of 2022, new youth movements have become widespread in Russia. The participants of one of them call themselves ‘offniks’ (‘offniks’), the other –‘Ryodan PMC’ [8]. The first community, the Ryodan PMC, appeared on the Vkontakte social network in September 2022 and quickly gained 190,000 members. As can be seen, the prison-oriented subculture-oriented PMC Wagner gained such popularity despite the fact that its members are dangerous criminals, and therefore the new movement itself was based solely on criminal ‘concepts’. ‘The ‘Ryodan’ PMC has been attributed with nationalist views. Members of the Ryodan PMC oppose ‘offniks “ (the modern name for hooligans and hooligans), skinheads and ”persons of non-Russian appearance’[9].

At the end of February 2023, simultaneous mass brawls involving supporters of the Ryodan PMC movement were prevented in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lutsk and other cities of Ukraine, which suggests that such actions were carefully organised [10]. Therefore, we can once again conclude how quickly this or that laboratory-grown criminal/prison subculture grown in Russia is transported to Ukraine.

[1] Blackman, S. (2014) Subculture theory: an historical and contemporary assessment of the concept for understanding deviance. Deviant Behaviour. 35 (6). Pp.496-512.
[2] Yinger, J. (1960). Contraculture and Subculture. American Sociological Review. 25. 5. Pp.625-635. P.628.
[3] Yinger, J. (1960). Contraculture and Subculture. American Sociological Review. 25. 5. Pp.625-635. P.629.
[4] Yinger, J. (1960). Contraculture and Subculture. American Sociological Review. 25. 5. Pp.625-635. P.629.
[5] Yinger, J. (1960). Contraculture and Subculture. American Sociological Review. 25. 5. Pp.625-635. P.629.
[6] Blackman, S. (2014). Subculture Theory: An Historical and Contemporary Assessment of the Concept for Understanding Deviance. Deviant Behaviour. 35 (6). Pp.496-512.
[7] Hartung, F. (1955). Review of ‘Delinquent Boys’. American Sociological Review. 20. P.752.
[8] News.Ru (2023). Who is behind the ‘Redan PMC’: anime fans caused controversy in the State Duma. 23.02.2023; DW (2023). What is the Redan PMC and where did it come from in Russia. 06.03.2023.
[9] Offniks or offniki (Russian for ‘football fans’) are a Russian youth subculture that stands out among others for its ostentatious aggressiveness. Most of them are teenagers aged 12-16. Unlike classic ultras, they may not be interested in football at all. The emphasis is on fights and on the right clothes – shmot.
[10] TSN (2023). Specifically dressed and arranging massive fights: the subculture of the Redan PMC from the Russian Federation is spreading across Ukraine. 02.03.2023.