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Three statistical series – the population of the Russian Federation, the number of prisoners, and the losses of Russian forces in the war against Ukraine – are usually analysed separately; since 24 February 2022, however, they have formed a single mechanism. A comparison of annual figures for 1991–2026 leads to the conclusion that the sharp decline in Russia’s prison population is the result neither of demographic decline nor of a “humanisation” of criminal policy, but largely reflects the transfer of prisoners to the front, where they suffer disproportionately high losses, which in turn deepen the demographic crisis.
Population figures are given as a reasonable average of Rosstat’s official estimate as of 1 January and the UN mid-year estimate. The prisoner count covers all persons held in institutions of the penal system, including pre-trial detention centres (SIZOs), as of 1 January, and for 2023–2026 is based on data from the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia (FSIN), UNODC, and statements by the leadership of the FSIN and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Where no published data are available, the author’s approximate estimates are given, taking into account the trends of previous years and the war (marked with “≈” and “author’s estimate”). Since 2015, Rosstat has included occupied Ukrainian Crimea in the population of the Russian Federation, and since 2014 penitentiary statistics have included institutions in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which only understates the real scale of the decline.
POPULATION DYNAMICS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Russia’s population has passed through three phases: a peak of 148.6 million in 1991–1993; a decline to 143.4 million in 2009–2010; and a formal “growth” to 147.1 million in 2020, which is almost entirely explained by the inclusion of occupied Crimea in the count (a jump of approximately 2.6 million people in 2015) and by the retrospective recalculation based on the 2021 census, the quality of which is reasonably contested. A new decline has been under way since 2021 (sources: Rosstat; UN).
The figures for 2022–2026 represent an upper bound. Natural population decrease in 2024 amounted to 599 thousand people, and the total fertility rate fell to 1.374 by the end of 2025. Since 2025, Rosstat has stopped publishing almost all demographic indicators; the population estimate as of 1 January 2026 has not been released, and independent demographers estimate the resident population at approximately 140 million. The figure of 144.1 million for 2026 is conservative and does not fully account for combat losses and emigration. Moreover, the small generation born during the demographic trough of the 1990s is now entering conscription and “contract” age, so the mobilisation pool of young men is shrinking irrespective of the war.
PRISON POPULATION DYNAMICS
Russia’s prison population fell from over 1 million in the late 1990s (peak: 1,073.2 thousand in March 2000) to 282 thousand in May 2026. The decline in 2000–2021 was gradual and linked to amnesties, the liberalisation of criminal law, and alternative sanctions; during 2021 it slowed to 17–18 thousand people per year. The 2021 Concept for the Development of the Penal System set the goal of reaching 300 thousand prisoners only by 2030.
Between 1 January 2022 and May 2026, the prison population fell from 465.9 thousand to 282 thousand, i.e. by 184 thousand, or 39.5%; in September–October 2022 alone, without any amnesty, the number of convicts held in penal colonies decreased by 23 thousand.
At the pre-war rate (20–25 thousand per year), 360–380 thousand people would have been held in institutions in May 2026; consequently, 80–100 thousand people cannot be accounted for by any “humanisation” (author’s estimate).
This is a lower bound, calculated from stocks rather than flows, and it is therefore consistent with the Ukrainian intelligence estimate of 140–180 thousand convicts drawn into the war as of November 2024.
The estimate for October 2026 (about 270 thousand) is based on the rate of decline in 2025–2026 (about 2 thousand per month) and the July 2026 law that expanded the range of convicts eligible to sign contracts.
COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND PRISONER NUMBERS
Comparing the two series makes it possible to reject the assumption that the decline in the number of prisoners is a consequence of demographic decline.
In 2000–2021, the population fluctuated within 143–147 million, while the incarceration rate fell from 722 to 329 per 100,000, i.e. it was determined by criminal policy rather than by demography. Between 2021 and May 2026, the population fell from approximately 146.7 to 144.1 million (by 1.8%), while the number of prisoners fell from 483 to 282 thousand (by 41.6%): the prison population was shrinking more than 20 times faster. The incarceration rate dropped to 196 per 100,000, which matches the World Prison Brief estimate (197). The sharpest break occurred in 2023–2024 (from 297 to 243), when recruitment into “Storm Z” became widespread.
REPORTS OF RUSSIAN COMBAT LOSSES
Russia does not officially disclose its losses. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, total combat personnel losses of Russian forces (killed and wounded) from 24 February 2022 to 1 October 2026 amount to approximately 1,535,870. The named list of the dead compiled by Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service contained 258,989 names as of 21 September 2026; Meduza and Mediazona estimated the number of dead at 352 thousand by the end of 2025, and British intelligence put it at almost 500 thousand as of May 2026.
Prisoners are a disproportionately affected category. Wagner recruited at least 48,366 prisoners; of the 19,547 Wagner fighters killed near Bakhmut, 17,175 (88%) were former inmates, and roughly one in three of those recruited was killed. In 2023, 28.2–29 thousand prisoners were recruited into “Storm Z”. As of July 2026, 26,069 dead former prisoners had been identified by name – one in ten on the list. This figure is known to be an undercount: status is established only on the basis of a published sentence, and in “Storm V” units convicts receive ordinary identity tags. A 10% share of 352–500 thousand dead yields 35–50 thousand, while the Wagner death share (35%) applied to 140–180 thousand recruits yields 49–63 thousand dead prisoners (author’s estimate).
The interrelationship between demographic dynamics, the decline in the number of prisoners, and combat losses
Comparing the three series reveals a causal chain.
The first link – demographic: Russia entered the war with natural population decrease, low fertility, and a small generation of young men; the partial mobilisation of 2022 triggered mass emigration and proved politically risky, so the state switched to manning the army from groups whose recruitment does not provoke public resistance.
The second link – penitentiary. Prisoners became the most accessible reserve: men of working age, dependent on the administration, unable to verify recruiters’ promises, and whose deaths cause minimal public resonance. The legislative institutionalisation of recruitment (November 2022, June 2023, 2024 – suspects and defendants, July 2026) explains the continuity of the decline and the historic low in pre-trial detention centres (SIZOs) – 89 thousand in March and 85 thousand in May 2026.
The third link – combat. Former prisoners were used in assault units with the highest mortality. The “excess” decline in the prison population (80–100 thousand), the intelligence estimate (140–180 thousand recruits), and over 26 thousand prisoners identified by name as killed are consistent with one another: tens of thousands of people who “disappeared” from penitentiary statistics were killed or wounded at the front.
The fourth link – the reverse demographic impact. Losses are concentrated among men aged 18–50; 352–500 thousand dead represent 0.25–0.35% of the population, which is comparable to the annual natural decrease (599 thousand in 2024). Together with emigration, they explain a significant part of the gap between the official (about 146 million) and independent (about 140 million) population estimates. The result is a vicious circle: the demographic crisis narrows the mobilisation base, the state compensates for it by recruiting in prisons, prisoners die disproportionately often, and their deaths deepen the demographic crisis.
CONCLUSIONS
The almost 40% decline in the number of prisoners in 2022–2026 outpaces the decline in population more than 20-fold, cannot be explained by the pre-war trend, and coincides chronologically with the waves of recruitment by Wagner, “Storm Z” and “Storm V”. The official “historic lows” are the statistical imprint of the transformation of the penitentiary system into a mobilisation reserve, as acknowledged by the FSIN leadership itself. The price of this “low” is tens of thousands of dead prisoners, and the demographic losses, concealed by the closure of Rosstat statistics, make the decline of Russia’s population irreversible in the medium term.
